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Abstract
We present a quantitative theory, based on crowd effects, for the market
volatility in a Minority Game played by a mixed population. Below a critical
concentration of generalized strategy players, we find that the volatility in
the crowded regime remains above the random coin-toss value regardless of
the ‘temperature’ controlling strategy use. Our theory yields good agreement
with numerical simulations.
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Challet and Zhang’s Minority Game (MG) offers a simple paradigm in the study of
complex adaptive systems such as financial markets [1–8]. In the MG an odd number N
of agents, each with s strategies and a memory of size m, repeatedly compete to be in the
minority. The basic MG features agents who use their highest scoring strategy. As pointed
out by Marsili et al [9], a probabilistic strategy choice reflects a particular behavioral model
and has a long tradition in economics. Cavagna et al performed numerical simulations
of the MG in which agents use such an exponential probability weighting controlled by a
‘temperature’ T [8]; this is called the Thermal Minority Game (TMG) although it has been
noted that T−1 more closely represents the agents’ learning rate (see Ref. [10]). Challet et
al, in addition to presenting a detailed spin-glass theory for the basic MG [2], have recently
identified problems [11] with the TMG results of Cavagna et al. [8]. Our own interest in
the TMG has focused on the finding that the volatility (i.e. standard deviation) σ can be
reduced from being larger than the random coin-toss value (‘worse-than-random’) to being
smaller than the random coin-toss value (‘better-than-random’) just by altering the relative
probability weighting [8]. We recently provided an analytic theory which explains this effect
in terms of crowds [12].
In this paper, we consider a generalized Minority Game in which a concentration q of
agents employ such probabilistic strategy selection at each turn of the game. We present
a quantitative theory, based on crowd effects, which yields good agreement with numerical
simulations. We find that below a critical concentration q∗c , the volatility σ remains larger
than the random coin-toss value regardless of the ‘temperature’ T controlling the strategy
selection.
Our generalized Minority Game contains N agents who choose repeatedly between option
0 (e.g. buy) and option 1 (e.g. sell). The winners are those in the minority group, e.g. sellers
win if there is an excess of buyers. The outcome at each timestep represents the winning
decision, 0 or 1. A common bit-string of the m most recent outcomes [13] is made available
to the agents at each timestep. The agents randomly pick s strategies at the beginning of the
game, with repetitions allowed, from the pool of all possible strategies. We focus on s = 2.
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After each turn, the agent assigns one (virtual) point to each of his strategies which would
have predicted the correct outcome. In the basic MG, each agent plays the most successful
strategy in his possession, i.e. the one with the most virtual points. Here we instead allow
a concentration q of agents to follow a more general behavioral model: in particular, these
agents play their worst strategy with probability θ, and hence play their best strategy with
probability (1 − θ). These qN agents will be called ‘TMG agents’ because of the direct
connection with the Thermal Minority Game [8,14]. The remaining (1− q)N agents choose
their best strategy with probability unity (i.e. θ = 0 as in the basic MG) hence they will be
called ‘MG agents’.
Figure 1 shows the volatility σ obtained from numerical simulations of a game with
N = 101 and m = 2, as a function of q at various fixed θ values. The dashed line shows
the random coin-toss value for N agents, given by
√
N/2. Figure 2 shows an example of
the corresponding numerical results for σ as a function of θ at fixed q. A definite trend can
be seen in Figs. 1 and 2, despite the numerical spread which arises naturally for different
runs: As the concentration q of TMG agents increases, or the probability θ (i.e. T [14])
increases, the volatility σ decreases. At q = 1 (Fig. 2) we reproduce the main finding of
Ref. [8] whereby σ falls from worse-than-random to better-than-random with increasing θ
(‘temperature’ T [14]). The numerical results in Fig. 1 indicate that below a critical q, σ
lies in the worse-than-random regime regardless of T . Our goal is to develop a quantitative
theory describing the trend in the run-averaged volatility (i.e. the volatility averaged over
initial strategy configurations) as a function of q and θ.
In Ref. [6] we presented a quantitative theory for the volatility σ in the basic MG which
yields good agreement with numerical simulations over the entire parameter range of in-
terest. The theory is based on the consideration of the combined actions of crowds and
their anticorrelated partners (anticrowds). For each crowd-anticrowd pair, the action of the
anticrowd will effectively nullify the action of the crowd if they are of similar size, hence
reducing the volatility σ [5,6]. For small m and large N [6] the crowds are typically much
larger than the anticrowds [6] hence the basic MG is in the ‘crowded’ regime (i.e. σ is larger
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than the random coin-toss value); this is the regime of interest here since we are focusing on
the transition of σ from worse-than-random to better-than-random. A cruder version of our
crowd theory was earlier shown to provide a good quantitative description for the MG played
by a population of mixed-memory agents [7,13]. Given this success, we build the present
theory using the same crowd-anticrowd ideas. Consider any two strategies r and r∗ within
the list of 2m+1 strategies in the reduced strategy space [1,6]. At any moment in the game,
the strategies can be ranked according to their virtual points, r = 1, 2 . . . 2m+1 where r = 1
is the best strategy, r = 2 is second best, etc. Note that in the small m regime of interest,
the strategy ranking in order of decreasing virtual points can be taken to be identical to
the strategy ranking in order of decreasing number of users (i.e. decreasing popularity) to a
good approximation [6]. Accidental degeneracies may arise whereby two different strategies
momentarily have identical virtual points, however these degeneracies are removed when
considering an average over several timesteps - hence any agent holding two strategies with
the same ranking must necessarily have picked the same strategy twice. Let p(r, r∗|r∗ ≥ r)
be the probability that a given agent picks r and r∗, where r∗ ≥ r. Let p(r, r∗|r∗ ≤ r) be the
probability that a given agent picks r and r∗, where r∗ ≤ r. The probability that a TMG
agent plays r is given by
pTMGr =
2m+1∑
r∗=1
[ θ p(r, r∗|r∗ ≤ r) + (1− θ) p(r, r∗|r∗ ≥ r)]
= θ p−(r) + 2
−2(m+1) θ + (1− θ) p+(r) (1)
where p+(r) =
∑
r∗ p(r, r
∗|r∗ ≥ r) is the probability that the agent has picked r and that r is
the agent’s best (or equal best) strategy; p−(r) =
∑
r∗ p(r, r
∗|r∗ < r) is the probability that
the agent has picked r and that r is the agent’s worst strategy. The factor 2−2(m+1) in Eq.
(1) originates from p(r, r∗|r∗ = r). The probability that an MG agent plays r is given by
pMGr = p+(r) . (2)
It follows that p+(r) + p−(r) = p(r) where
p(r) = 2−m(1− 2−(m+2)) (3)
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is the probability that an agent holds strategy r after his s = 2 picks with no condition on
whether it is best or worst. Now we consider the mean number of agents nr playing strategy
r in the mixed-population game containing a concentration q of TMG agents and (1− q) of
MG agents. This is given by
nr = q N p
TMG
r + (1− q) N pMGr
= N (1− 2 q θ) p+(r) +N q θ p(r) + 2−2(m+1) N q θ . (4)
If nr agents all use strategy r, they will act as a ‘crowd’, i.e. they make the same decision. If
nr¯ agents simultaneously use the strategy r¯ anticorrelated to r, they will make the opposite
(anticorrelated) decision and hence act as an ‘anticrowd’ [6]. The standard deviation σ(q, θ)
in the number of agents making a particular decision (say 0) is given by [6]
σ(q, θ) =
[
1
2
2m+1∑
r=1
1
4
|nr − nr¯|2
] 1
2
. (5)
Using Eqs. (3), (4) and (5) for r and r¯ = 2m+1 + 1− r we obtain
σ(q, θ) = [1− 2 q θ] {σ(q, θ)}qθ=0 (6)
where {σ(q, θ)}qθ=0 is just the standard deviation for the basic MG (i.e. q = 0 and/or θ = 0).
In Ref. [6], we provided an analytic formulation of {σ(q, θ)}qθ=0. However, Eq. (6) is more
general in that it does not specify the level of approximation used to obtain {σ(q, θ)}qθ=0.
Our theory (Eq. (6)) predicts that the effect on the volatility caused by a change in
population composition and/or ‘temperature’ can be described by a simple prefactor [1−2qθ].
Provided that the basic MG is in the crowded regime as discussed earlier, Eq. (6) should
hold for all N and m and hence any value of {σ(q, θ)}qθ=0. Hence we can predict the critical
value qc for fixed θ, or θc for fixed q, at which σ(q, θ) crosses from worse-than-random to
better-than-random. For a given value of θ, it follows from Eq. (6) that
qc(θ) =
1
2θ
−
√
N
4θ
1
{σ(q, θ)}qθ=0 . (7)
A similar expression follows for θc(q). Given that 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1/2 [14], Eq. (7) implies that
the run-averaged numerical volatility should lie above the random coin-toss value if q < q∗c
where
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q∗c = 1−
√
N
2
1
{σ(q, θ)}qθ=0 , (8)
regardless of ‘temperature’ T [14]. Since we are considering N and m values such that
the basic MG is in the worse-than-random regime, {σ(q, θ)}qθ=0 ≥
√
N/2 and therefore
0 ≤ q∗c ≤ 1 as required. Similarly σ(q, θ) will remain above the random coin-toss value for
all q if θ < θ∗c where
θ∗c =
1
2
−
√
N
4
1
{σ(q, θ)}qθ=0 . (9)
Figures 1 and 2 compare the present theory (Eq. (6)) to the numerical simulations. The
theoretical points lie within the numerical spread over a wide range of q and θ values, and
hence provide a quantitative explanation of the observed trends. Since we are interested in
testing the simple prefactor scaling predicted by Eq. (6), we have generated Figs. 1 and
2 using the numerical value of {σ(q, θ)}qθ=0 obtained from the basic MG; we emphasize,
however, that an analytic formulation for {σ(q, θ)}qθ=0 is provided in Ref. [6]. Although
not relevant for the main results of this paper, the present theory (Eq. (6)) begins to
underestimate the numerical results in the better-than-random regime as σ(q, θ) → 0 (not
shown). There are shortcomings in the theory which can explain this effect; in particular,
pTMGr in Eq. (1) is an average value over the configuration space of possible initial strategy
picks, and over time. It has a decreasing dependence on r as θ → 0.5, hence giving rise to
σ = 0 (i.e. exact crowd-anticrowd cancellation) for q = 1 and θ = 0.5. Consider q = 1 and
θ = 0.5; for a particular configuration of strategies picked at the start of the game, and at a
particular moment in time, the number of agents using each strategy is typically distributed
around the value N 2−(m+1). It is this non-flat distribution describing the strategy-use by
coin-flipping TMG agents which will actually give rise to a non-zero σ. Having obtained σ
for a given initial configuration of strategies, the average should then be taken over all initial
strategy configurations. We have shown that carrying out this procedure yields a non-zero
theoretical σ and restores agreement with the numerical data in the better-than-random
regime [15].
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Figure 3 shows the theoretical ‘phase diagram’ for the volatility σ(q, θ). The curve qc(θ),
or equivalently θc(q), separates the regions where σ is worse-than-random and better-than-
random. Also indicated are q∗c and θ
∗
c .
In summary we have analyzed a mixed population Minority Game with generalized
strategies. The main feature of the numerical results regarding volatility-reduction from
worse-than-random to better-than-random, can be explained quantitatively without having
to solve the detailed game dynamics. More generally, it is clear that there will be some prop-
erties of MG games which cannot be described using such time- and configuration-averaged
theories as used here (see Ref. [10]). Moreover, the volatility in real financial markets is
more likely to correspond to a single run which evolves from a specific initial configuration
of agents’ strategies. Our crowd-anticrowd viewpoint can, however, be extended to deal
with these game dynamics via the dynamical equations governing the co-evolution of the
crowd-anticrowd populations. The correct equations are not continuous in time in general.
The MG dynamics described in terms of the time-evolution of crowds-anticrowds will be
presented elsewhere [15].
7
REFERENCES
[1] D. Challet and Y.C. Zhang, Physica A 246, 407 (1997); ibid. 256, 514 (1998); ibid.
269, 30 (1999).
[2] D. Challet and M. Marsili, Phys. Rev. E 60, R6271 (1999); D. Challet, M. Marsili,
and R. Zecchina, Phys. Rev. Lett. 84, 1824 (2000); D. Challet and M Marsili, cond-
mat/9908480.
[3] R. Savit, R. Manuca and R. Riolo, Phys. Rev. Lett. 82, 2203 (1999).
[4] R. D’Hulst and G.J. Rodgers, Physica A 270, 514 (1999).
[5] N.F. Johnson, M. Hart and P.M. Hui, Physica A 269, 1 (1999).
[6] M. Hart, P. Jefferies, N.F. Johnson and P.M. Hui, cond-mat/0003486.
[7] N.F. Johnson, M. Hart, P.M. Hui and D. Zheng, cond-mat/9910072; N.F. Johnson, P.M.
Hui, D. Zheng and M. Hart, J. Phys. A: Math. Gen. 32 L427 (1999).
[8] A. Cavagna, J.P. Garrahan, I. Giardina and D. Sherrington, Phys. Rev. Lett. 83, 4429
(1999); see also J.P. Garrahan, E. Moro and D. Sherrington, cond-mat/0004277.
[9] M. Marsili, D. Challet and R. Zecchina, cond-mat/9908480. T -dependent, Boltzmann-
like strategy weightings were discussed by M. Marsili at the International Workshop on
Econophysics and Statistical Finance (Palermo, September 1998); see Physica A 269,
9 (1999).
[10] M. Marsili and D. Challet, Adv. Complex Systems 1, 1 (2000).
[11] D. Challet, M. Marsili and R. Zecchina, cond-mat/0004308.
[12] M. Hart, P. Jefferies, N.F. Johnson and P.M. Hui, cond-mat/0004063.
[13] See D. Challet and M. Marsili, cond-mat/0004196 and references therein for demon-
strations confirming the relevance of the actual memory in the MG, in contrast to the
8
claim of A. Cavagna [Phys. Rev. E 59, R3783 (1999)].
[14] The Thermal Minority Game discussed in Ref. [8] depends on a parameter T (or equiva-
lently 1/β) called a ‘temperature’. We could similarly define T by setting the probability
of playing the worst strategy θ = e−β/(eβ + e−β). Hence T = 2[ln(θ−1 − 1)]−1. T = 0
corresponds to θ = 0 while T →∞ corresponds to θ→ 1/2, hence we will only consider
0 ≤ θ ≤ 1/2 in this paper.
[15] M. Hart, P. Jefferies, N.F. Johnson and P.M. Hui, in preparation.
9
Figure Captions
Figure 1: Comparison between numerical simulations (circles) and the present theory (solid
line using Eq. (6)) for the volatility σ as a function of TMG agent concentration q at fixed
θ: (a) θ = 0.1, (b) θ = 0.3 and (c) θ = 0.5. The ‘temperature’ T corresponding to each θ
is given (see Ref. [14]). N = 101 and m = 2. Numerical data are shown for several runs.
Dashed line shows random coin-toss value.
Figure 2: Comparison between numerical simulations (circles) and the present theory (solid
line using Eq. (6)) for the volatility σ as a function of the probability θ for a pure population
of TMG agents (i.e. q = 1). N = 101 and m = 2. Numerical data are shown for several
runs. Dashed line shows random coin-toss value.
Figure 3: ‘Phase diagram’ in (q, θ) space. Curve corresponds to Eq. (7) and separates
regions where volatility σ lies above the random coin-toss value (‘worse-than-random’) and
below (‘better-than-random’). N and m values as in Fig. 1.
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